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LEX LOCI DOCTRINE
after July, 1964.38 Hardly can a club be a private association where
the members do not meet together.
It seems apparent that Northwest La. Restaurant Club is a rela-
tively "easy" case, and that the court had little trouble concluding
that the members were not in such a relation that the private club
exemption should be invoked to protect rights of private association.
Such a protectable association did not exist. Because of the ease in
deciding that this was indeed a "sham organization," 9 the court
here simply was not called upon for extensive articulation of the
precise factors that led to the decision.
However, hard cases will come, and more judicial refinement of
the factors considered will be necessary and welcomed. For example,
what will be the decision in regard to the genuinely private club that
grows larger and larger? Will the greater number of members,
many of whom perhaps do not know one another, render the club
so "open.to the public" that it will cease to be exempted? How
would a court hold on a facility, such as a golf course, which ordi-
narily constitutes a place of public accommodation, but operates as
a "private" club, with associational interests existing among the
members ?40 ROBERT L. THOMPSON
Conflict of Laws-Departure from Lex Loci
In Clark v. Clark1 the New Hampshire court applied its own
law and allowed a guest passenger to sue her host for ordinary
negligence rather than applying the stricter Vermont guest statute.
The parties were both from New Hampshire; the automobile acci-
dent occurred in Vermont. The decision was a logical extension of
that court's recent holdings in the area of conflicts law. Earlier in
Thompson v. Thompson2 the court abandoned its adherence to
strict lex loci delicti which requires application of the law of the
place of the wrong, overruled a long line of cases, and applied the
3 Id. at 153.
19 Id. at 153.
," Professor Van Alstyne suggests this problem. Van Alstyne, Civil
Rights: A New Public Accommodations Law for Ohio, 22 OHio ST. L.J.
683, 688 (1961).
-- N.H.- , 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
2 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963).
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law of New Hampshire when deciding an interspousal tort suit.
They followed Thompson with a consistent holding in Johnson v.
Johnsons by refusing to invoke their own interspousal law when
the litigants were from Massachusetts even though the accident oc-
curred and suit was brought in New Hampshire. In a third case,
Dow v. Larrabee,4 the court held that Massachusetts law should
decide the degree of care necessary in a suit between New Hamp-
shire residents over an auto accident that occurred in Massachusetts.
The holding was based upon a finding that Massachusetts was the
state with the most significant relations.5
Clark v. Clark is the final and complete rejection of traditional
lex loci application. The court candidly explained in Clark that in
their recent holdings they had thought the "mechanical rule ought to
be discarded, but unlike some of the other states . . . [they were]
unwilling to abandon it completely until reasonably sure that a more
satisfactory rule was available to take its place."6 Now they are
reasonably sure.
New Hampshire follows a small number of states' which have
been persuaded to embark upon what North Carolina Justice Rod-
man terms an "uncharted sea."" The courses taken have varied
considerably as the courts ventured from the relatively smooth
waters of lex loci delicti.
For example, California in the first case9 to "break the ice"'"
characterized a tort case as a question of "family relationship"
which should be decided by the law of the domicile. Pennsylvania
weighed the relative interests of the states involved in reaching its
decision. 1 Similarly New York applied what it calls the "center of
'107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966).
'107 N.H. 70, 217 A.2d 506 (1966).
Id. at -, 217 A.2d at 508.
-- N.H. at - , 222 A.2d at 207.
' See, Lauritizen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Emery v. Emery, 45
Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249
Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957) ; Wilson v. Faull, 27 N.J. 105, 141 A.2d
768 (1958); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d
796 (1964); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 616, 129 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1963).
Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).1oHaumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 134, 95 N.W.2d
814, 816 (1959). The court reviewed many cases but considered California
as the first state to depart from lex loci.
"t Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964), 43
N.C.L. Ray. 586 (1965).
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gravity" theory.12 Wisconsin used a three step analysis and opti-
mistically predicted a forth-coming "common law of conflicts that
will be administered with uniformity as jurisdictions generally
adopt this rule.' 8
Legal scholars have suggested lists of factors to be considered
in decision making by courts that reject lex loci. An article by Pro-
fessors Cheatham and Reese sets out nine factors,,4 and Professor
Yotema's scheme embodies seventeen.' 5 The New Hampshire court
in the Clark case relied explicitly upon the five "choice-influencing
considerations" as outlined and elaborated upon in a recent law
review article by Professor Leflar.' 6 Other authorities have written
extensively on the question, invariably urging an abandonment of
lea loci delicti in favor of a decision making process that would
balance the policies and interests of the contact states.' 7 The Re-
statement (Second), "Conflict of Laws," § 379 (Tent. Draft No.
9 1964) also reflects the current trend and reverses the Restatement's
traditional position.'
In the face of and despite the overwhelming academic mandate
1" Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963).
" Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 633, 133 N.W.2d 408, 416 (1965).
" Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLUM. L. REv.
959 (1952).
' Yotema, The Objectives of Private International Law, 35 CAN. B.
REv. 721 (1957).
" Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U.L. REv. 267 (1966).
1 7 DICEY, CONFLICTS OF LAws (7th ed. 1958) ; STUMBERG, CONFLICTS OF
LAws (3d ed. 1963); Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47
HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933); Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of
Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1944); Cheatham &
Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 959 (1952); Cook,
The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457
(1924); Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in
Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1212, 1233 (1963); Harper, Policy
Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading Professor Loren-
zen's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155 (1947); Hill, Governmental Interest and
the Conflict of Laws, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 463 (1960); Lorenzen, Territorial-
ity, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924);
Reese, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Con-
flict of Laws, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1212, 1251 (1963); Traynor, Is This
Conflict Realty Necessary? 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657 (1959); Weintraup, A
Method for Solving Conflicts Problens: Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215 (1963);
Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J.
468 (1928).
18 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 378 (1934), applies the law of
the place of the wrong in traditional lex loci fashion.
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and growing acceptance by other courts, North Carolina continues
to reject categorically all assaults upon lex loci.19 The North Caro-
lina court has been criticized in this Review 0 for refusing to alter
its position but, as one case surveyor has observed, evidences no
propensity for change.2 1 Upon viewing the varied results of the
courts which have been blown by "the winds of change"2 and the
result of Clark v. Clark in particular, it is not difficult to under-
stand the court's reluctance. For example, the future decisions of
the New Hampshire court will be based upon "the court's prefer-
ence for what it regards as the sounder rule of law, as between the
two competing ones."23 Certainly, predictability and consistency are
not lightly to be sacrificed to such open ended discretion.
However, it is clear that in a limited class of cases strict applica-
tion of lex loci renders results which are not in keeping with estab-
lished policy and preference as expressed in the substantive law of
North Carolina. The most prominent examples are motor vehicle
cases containing the following common elements: (1) All parties to
the litigation are residents of the forum state. (2) The action re-
sults from a tort by one against the other. (3) The commission of
the tort occurred while the parties were in transit, having left the
forum state together and intending to return.
It is submitted that these cases should be excepted from the lex
loci delicti doctrine and that this can be done without a substantial
departure from the present rules. Lex loci was firmly entrenched
in the law before the automobile afforded a cheap, fast, convenient,
but not always safe means of interstate travel. 4 Thus, this factor
was not a primary consideration when formulating tort law in the
area of conflicts. That it has become a consideration demanding
special treatment should not now be denied. This is especially true
See, e.g., Cobb v. Clark, 265 N.C. 194, 143 S.E.2d 103 (1965) ; Conrad
v. Miller Motor Express, Inc., 265 N.C. 427, 144 S.E.2d 269 (1965) ; Petrea
v. Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., 264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965); Crow v.
Ballard, 263 N.C. 475, 139 S.E.2d 624 (1965).0 See 43 N.C.L. REv. 586 (1965); 42 N.C.L. Rlv. 419 (1964).
'
1 Wurfel, Conflict of Laws, N. C. Case Law, 43 N.C.L. Rav. 895, 899
(1965).
22 Ibid.28 - N.H. at - , 222 A.2d at 209.
2" Hipps v. Southern Ry., 177 N.C. 472, 99 S.E. 335 (1919); Harrison
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 168 N.C. 382, 84 S.E. 519 (1915); Hancock v.
Telegraph Co., 142 N.C. 163, 55 S.E. 82 (1906). Accord, Shaw v. Lee, 258
N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
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when the cases are examined in the light of the applicable North
Carolina law.
Two particular situations should be analyzed. First is where a
North Carolina wife is denied an action against her husband in
tort because the law of the place of the wrong would deny a wife
such an action.2 5 Second is where a North Carolina guest is re-
quired to show gross rather than ordinary negligence on the part of
his North Carolina host under a guest statute of the lez loci.2" In
the circumstances above North Carolina substantive law would allow
the wife to sue her husband2" and require the guest only to prove
ordinary negligence.2 8 North Carolina's position is based in the first
instance upon a statute favoring a wife, 9 and in the second upon a
continued refusal either by statute or judicial decision to lower a
host's standard of care to his guest.30
Those states which do forbid interspousal suits generally do so
in order to encourage domestic harmony 1 while those requiring a
greater degree of negligence on the part of the host seek to avoid
collusive suits 2 and to discourage ingratitude on the part of the
guest.8 It is clear that these considerations do not influence the
North Carolina court when deciding its own law."4 Neither do they
influence decisions when the court applies the law of another juris-
" Petrea v. Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., 264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965) ;
Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963); Bogen v. Bogen, 219
N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941) ; Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E.
101 (1931).
' Nix v. English, 254 N.C. 414, 119 S.E.2d 220 (1961) ; Baird v. Baird,
223 N.C. 730, 28 S.E.2d 225 (1943); Brumsey v. Mathias, 216 N.C. 743,
6 S.E.2d 495 (1940); Farfour v. Fahad, 214 N.C. 281, 199 S.E. 521 (1938);
Wright v. Pettus, 209 N.C. 732, 184 S.E. 494 (1936); Wise v. Hollowell,
205 N.C. 286, 171 S.E. 82 (1933).
27N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-4 (1965); Foster v. Foster, 264 N.C. 694, 142
S.E.2d 638 (1965) ; Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920).
" McGee v. Cox, 267 N.C. 314, 148 S.E.2d 132 (1966); Boykin v.
Bissette, 260 N.C. 295, 132 S.E.2d 616 (1963); Nantz v. Nantz, 255 N.C.
357, 121 S.E.2d 561 (1961).
' See note 27 supra.
30 See note 28 supra.
" Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963); Haum-
schild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959); Ford,
Interspotsal Liability for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws, 15
U. PiTrr. L. REv. 397 (1954).
"2 Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 123 (1929) ; Ehrenweig, Guest Statutes
in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1960).
" This reflects the adage that a dog should not bite the hand that feeds
it. See, e.g., Chaplowe v. Powsner, 119 Conn. 188, 175 Atl. 470 (1934).
" See notes 27-28 supra.
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diction since the question then is the law of the loci and not why it
is applied. 5 Therefore, the court is precluded from examining the
status of the litigants or the purpose of the foreign state's law.
The problem is clear. North Carolinians risk the loss of the
liberal protection of their own law when they leave the state in an
automobile either with their husband or as a guest passenger. This
is true although they depart from the state in property licensed by
the state, driven by a driver licensed by the state, covered with in-
surance issued in accordance with and paid for at a rate which con-
templates liability in accordance with state law.36 There is some
support for a change in the area of conflicts which would allow a
more equitable result in these cases.
In Bogen v. Bogen3t the North Carolina court allowed an Ohio
wife who was injured by the negligence of her husband on North
Carolina roads to sue although she probably could not have main-
tained her action in Ohio." The majority opinion did not depart
from lex loci since North Carolina was both the loci and fori, but in
applying its law the court used strong and poetic language to express
a prejudice for allowing a wife to sue her husband.39 They quoted
an earlier opinion where the idea that husband and wife are one is
ridiculed as "an inference drawn by courts in a barbarous age"4
and where the court in reaffirming a belief in tort relief for a wife
said: "Civilization and justice have progressed thus far with us, and
never again will 'the sun go back ten degrees on the dial of Ahaz.'
Isaiah, 38:8 "41 It would seem that such strong belief in a wife's
rights would be present sixty-six years later, but in conflicts cases
we sometimes do indeed allow "the sun to go back."
" Cobb v. Clark, 265 N.C. 194, 143 S.E.2d 103 (1965); Petrea v. Ryder
Tank Lines, Inc., 264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965); Shaw v. Lee, 258
N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963); cf. Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware,
Inc., v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1963); Bogen
v. Bogen, 219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941).
" See, for discussion on insurance and suggestion that parties may pur-
chase coverage with the liability imposed by the principal place of driving in
mind, Ehrenweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L.J.
595 (1960).
"219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941).
The court did not have to decide the correct Ohio Law. Id. at 54, 12
S.E.2d at 652.
'°Id. at 53, 12 S.E.2d at 651.Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 523, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920).
Id. at 524, 105 S.E. at 210.
[vol. 45
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Ironically, the three dissenting judges in Bogeit' would have
abandoned the strict le% loci doctrine and refused the wife her ac-
tion on the basis that the right to compensation is a chose in action
which is personal property. Since the situs of personal property is
the residence of the owner, they would have applied the law of the
domicile. The dissent was somewhat ahead of its time, for the
reasoning is similar to the "center of gravity" theory used by some
courts today.
43
It is also significant that in 1963 a federal court sitting in North
Carolina, when faced with the problem of how the North Carolina
court would decide a conflicts question, anticipated a "more flexible
approach which would allow the court in each case to inquire which
state has the most significant relationships. . . -"" A subsequent
decision by the North Carolina Supreme Court makes it clear the
federal court incorrectly stated the North Carolina law.45 How-
ever, the implication is that a federal judge felt the court was on
the threshold of, or at least amiable to, change.
The recent passage of the Uniform Commercial Code46 and
other statutes permit the courts to deviate from strict lex loci. The
Code allows the parties to agree which state's law will apply in a
contract situation when two jurisdictions are involved ;47 the Work-
man's Compensation Act provides compensation provisions for em-
ployees incidentally injured outside the state;48 and the Insurance
Act deems insurance contracts to have been made in this state and
subject to its laws if property, lives or interests in the state are
covered or if applications were taken in the state.49
The New Hampshire court states that North Carolina clings to
lex loci but speculates that its "failure to reject it has resulted from
an unwillingness to abandon established precedent before they were
sure that a better rule was available, not to any belief that the old
219 N.C. at 55, 12 S.E.2d at 211.
See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
"' Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 319 F.2d 469, 473 (4th Cir. 1963).
"'Farmer v. Ferris, 260 N.C. 619, 133 S.E.2d 492 (1963); Wurfel, Con-flict of Laws, N.C. Case Law, 43 N.C.L. Riv. 895, 896 (1965).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-1-101 to -10-107 (1965). The Code becomes
effective midnight, June 30, 1967.
'rN.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-105 (1965).
•N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-36 (1965).
'"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-28 (1965).
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rule was a good one."5 Whether or not this is the North Carolina
court's position, there is good argument for the court making ex-
press exceptions to protect legal rights now often nullified by cross-
ing state boundaries. As suggested, the exception would be a very
narrow one and apply only to residents injured in automobiles
driven by a resident while in transit from and intended to return
to the state of residence. This approach would allow the court to
alleviate inequities and effect clear policies while awaiting a suitable
alternative, if the court desires an alternative, to lex loci delicti. Such
an approach would preserve predictability and consistency in North
Carolina conflicts law.
PHrILIP G. CARSON
Constitutional Law-Criminal Law-The "Mere Evidence"
Rule-Applicability to the States
The mere evidence rule of Gouled v. United States,1 that it is a
violation of the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure to take evidence from a defendant's premises
unless that evidence is contraband, stolen property, or an instru-
mentality of a crime, was declared by the United States Supreme
Court in 1921. Courts have found it difficult to apply the instru-
mentality exception, and the theory of the rule has been harshly
criticized.2 After the decision in Mapp v. Ohio,3 which requires
that evidence taken in violation of the fourth amendment be excluded
in state trials, the question was certain to arise whether Gouled
should be applied to the states.
"0 N.H. at - , 222 A.2d at 207.
1255 U.S. 298 (1921).
'MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT § 5.04 (1957); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 2184a, 2264 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'Although the mere evidence rule rests primarily on the fourth amend-
ment, the peculiar origin of the rule in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886), gave rise to a theory that the rule rests on a dual basis of the
fourth and fifth amendments. Boyd did not involve a search at all, but a
court order to produce incriminating documents. In invalidating the order
the United States Supreme Court first announced that a search for mere
evidence was prohibited by the fourth amendment. Next the order was de-
clared invalid under the fifth amendment prohibition against self-incrimina-
tion. Although a dissent insisted that the fifth amendment alone was the
correct basis for the decision, a third justification for the holding was added:
[Vol. 45
